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1. Introduction 
Railways and their impact on the means of travel dominated especially the late nineteenth century.  
Their development was technologically driven and their success came from the way in which they 
outstripped particularly the slower means of transport.  Another technological development, the 
creation of the internal combustion engine, brought the advent of the motor vehicle era, first in the 
form of the car and then for the public passenger carrying vehicle and the transport of goods. 
The early twentieth century brought a tension between these two modes in an environment where the 
UK railways were highly regulated both on safety grounds and restricted in the rates or charges they 
could make.  The upsurge of motor traffic was in contrast unregulated.  Importantly too, the capital 
structure of the two modes was quite different.  The railways required significant investment, funded 
by private capital whereas the motor industry, as it became technically efficient, was within the means 
of individual entrepreneurs. 
This tension may have been resolved differently if political events, notably World War 1 (WW1) had 
not intervened.  The use of the railways during the hostilities left the UK Government with its first 
major ‘transport problem’ of the twentieth century.  The political ideology of the time was not in 
favour of state ownership, although this was considered, and the resolution of the railway ‘problem’ 
whilst the assets were still in private hands gave rise to a powerful lobby. 
Whilst the railway ‘problem’ was being resolved, the motor bus industry grew rapidly.  So rapidly that 
it gave rise to congestion and safety concerns, particularly in London and this led the Government to 
act.  Acting as a result of safety concerns appears to mark the UK Government as different from its 
European neighbours where concern over railway and bus competition appears to have been the spur 
for the control of the bus industry. 
In private ownership, the railways had their shareholders to satisfy.  This led them to seek powers to 
buy into the bus companies and this was achieved towards the end of the 1920s decade.  Alongside 
this, the Government appointed a Royal Commission to consider the ‘transport problem’.  Their 
suggestions for the control of buses enshrined the recommendations of the earlier Committee set up to 
resolve safety.  The implementation of these proposals was enacted by the 1930 Road Traffic Act and 
the first years of operation of this Act led to significant changes in industrial structure.  In the name of 
making the industry less chaotic, it was changed from being dominated by the small operator to 
domination by the large and a great amount of conformity in the name of co-ordination. 
World War 2(WW2) brought an increased demand for mobility and this was met by both the railways 
and the motor bus.  The post-war Government, as after WW1, was faced with a railway crisis resulting 
from the use of the railways during wartime.  However, this Government, the newly elected Labour 
Government, had a well formulated policy for the nationalisation of all transport activities to meet the 
aim of co-ordinated and integrated transport.  Unfortunately the implementation was frustrated by a 
lack of clear direction and organisational contradictions. 
This paper begins by looking at railway policy at the time the bus industry was beginning to develop 
and at the early development of the motor bus.  The next section considers the origins of regulatory 
control for the motor bus before turning to how this regulation changed the industrial structure of the 
bus industry prior to WW2.  Post-war nationalisation is then examined before commenting on the 
nature of co-ordination issues between the railways and buses in the early twentieth century context 
and the implications for modern transport policy. 
The paper identifies as a critical point that, despite all the legislation being framed as intentioned on 
integration or co-ordination, these terms were not defined or not well defined.  UK policy was always 
clouded by the discussion of ownership and the role that this played in the ability to ‘co-ordinate’ or 
‘integrate’.  Moreover, the evidence points to UK policy being one of ‘fire-fighting’ or only having 
action when urgent.   
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2. Pre-World War 1 railways 
The railways were of course well established by the time of the outbreak of World War 1 (WW1).  In 
the UK, in common with other countries, the railway system was built by private companies, both 
large and small.  This diverse set of owners was in competition often, particularly in areas where 
spatially their lines were close together.   
Whilst the railways were privately owned, they were under significant public control for safety and 
also for the charges or ‘rates’ that they could make.  Up until 1913, maximum rates were fixed for 
freight under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1888 and subsequent Orders under that Act:  these 
specified maximum rates for classes of goods.  In 1913, as a result of rising labour costs, a new Act 
(the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1913) allowed many of these rates to rise.  For passengers, the 
initial legislation which allowed the railway to be built (either inaugurating or special Acts of 
Parliament) governed the fares that could be charged.  The Parliamentary trains legislation (Railway 
Regulation Act, 1844) established the provision of third class coaches (with the right to take 
significant luggage) to facilitate travel in search of work.  The Cheap Trains Act of 1883, which 
exempted the duty for any train charging less than a 1d per mile fare, required the railway companies 
to operate a larger number of these trains:  this marked the beginning of the worker’s train.  The main 
motivation for this latter legislation was the political drive to reduce overcrowding in major cities by 
encouraging workers to move to new housing developments outside but this of course needed cheap 
transport back into the city for work.  Whilst this Act was entitled the Cheap Trains Act, 1d per mile 
would have been still beyond the means of most of the workers of the time. 
During the war, the railways were operated by the Government’s Railway Executive Committee 
(REC).  This was set up in 1912 with war-time control in mind and consisted of the general managers 
of the various larger main line companies, using legislation that had long been on the statutes 
(Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871), in recognition of the strategic necessity to control the lines of 
communication.  The railways retained their private ownership; day to day management was through 
the REC.  This left the services of the railway network at the Government’s disposal for which 
compensation was paid to the railway owners.  At the end of the war, the railways were in poor shape– 
there was a shortage of rolling stock and the intensity of use of the system meant that much routine 
maintenance had not taken place, particularly as many of the railway workers had been lost to the 
armed forces for the duration.   There was much discussion about how the handover from the 
Government should take place and there was support, according to Aldcrofti for some sort of 
reorganisation of the railway companies so that there were fewer companies overall.  From the 
Government’s point of view, the need for reorganisation became pressing as it was still underwriting 
the railway companies’ revenues.  1919 was a critical year when it became clear that the railways were 
also now in financial difficulties with their costs rapidly increasing from rising wage rates but with 
fares still controlled.  There had been some debate too as to whether reorganisation would also include 
change of ownership but commentators have claimed that the Government was not ready for thisii.  By 
1920,  a White Paper published by the Government (Outline of Proposals as to the Future 
Organisation of Transport Undertakings in Great Britain and their Relation to the State) proposed 
reorganisation into seven companies.  By the time the Act that brought this reorganisation into being 
(the Railways Act, 1921) the number of companies were reduced to four large, geographically based 
units, dubbed ‘The Big Four of the New Railway Era’ by the popular press.  Whilst the legislation was 
complex, the Grouping (as it became called) was implemented rapidly with the new organisation being 
in place in January 1923.   
In summary therefore, the railways emerged from WW1 with a run-down rolling stock and a system 
which had suffered from lack of investment and lack of maintenance and repair work.  Much 
consideration was given to the future of the then privately owned railways, and the possibility of 
nationalisation was contemplated and rejected.  Post-war wages and the costs in the rail industry were 
considerably higher than pre-war levels and yet their regulated rates had not been changed.  The 
outcome was private ownership with a significant degree of regulatory control on rates as well as other 
aspects of the business, such as safety. 
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3. The early days of motorised buses  
Whilst business and Government concern was focussed on the continued regulation of the railways, 
the bus industry was born and came very much to life.  Pioneer motor vehicles did exist before 1914, 
but they came to prominence after the war when vehicles had become much more reliable and their 
mass production had commenced.   
Road vehicles which carried passengers for fares could be subjected to the Town Police Clauses Acts 
of 1847 and 1889.  Whilst the former was exclusively concerned with hackney carriages (or taxis, as 
now known), the latter extended the provisions to the additional problems presented by omnibuses (or 
buses, as now known) although these were, of course, non-motorised.  These Acts allowed local 
authorities (town councils, urban district councils and any rural district council) to licence the vehicle 
if they had successfully obtained an Order from the Minister of Health.  But it should be clear that this 
legislation was enabling and originally designed for horse transport and there was no statutory duty to 
implement it.  Moreover, the form of licence was simply on the vehicle itself:  if the powers were used 
and a vehicle was licensed, this gave it the right to ply for hire anywhere in that district without 
restriction as to time, place or fare. 
The advent of the internal combustion engine created undoubtedly the most revolutionary 
development in the whole field of transport in the first half of the twentieth centuryiii.  Over the period 
1904 to 1914, motor cars had increased by 1460% and motor hackneys (including both buses and 
taxis) had increased by 857%iv.  Figures for cars and buses in use show that the initial growth in 
motorisation was manifested in the growth of the motor car and was followed by the growth in motor 
passenger carrying vehicles which accelerated after 1920v.  These show the dramatic growth in private 
motor cars was only halted by the World War 2(WW2).  In the UK, it was London which pioneered 
the motor bus:  in 1905, the London General, together with other horse bus operators, decided to 
experiment with motor buses.  This led to a rapid progression from horse to motor power so that by 
1914, the Metropolitan Police records show that the 3551 horse buses in existence in 1904 had been 
replaced by 3057 motor busesvi. 
Development outside London was slower but by 1914, before the WW1 checked further expansion, 
many of the public transport services were using motorised vehicles.  After WW1, various factors 
combined to provide an acceleration in numbers.  First, large numbers of men had become skilled in 
both servicing and driving motor vehicles in the war.  Second, large numbers of ex-servicemen had 
gratuities to spend on the glut of lorries which flooded the market at the end of the war effort.  Perhaps 
most importantly on the supply side was the way in which the war period had seen a dramatic 
improvement in the technical performance of these vehicles.   
But supply changes by themselves would not have been enough.  The war also affected the UK’s 
population’s aspirations for mobility and had led to a stimulation of demand.   This was true both for 
local services – services providing transport within urban areas – as well as journeys over longer 
distances – both the ‘express’ type service and the extension of the ‘excursion and tour’ market.  This 
is reflected in the huge growth in the private sector provision of motorised passenger carrying 
vehicles.   
The excursions and tours market is a special case which is not well documented.  Prior to the 
regulation put in place in 1930, there are no official statistics relating to excursions and tours and 
much of the information is anecdotal.  However, many of the new operators of charabancs found a 
niche in this market and extended the ideas formerly undertaken by horse-drawn coaches.  Excursions 
or day trips had been made, prior to the advent of the motor vehicle, by horse-drawn coaches or 
charabancs to the Lake District (Cowperthwaite’s, Taylor’s and Irwins’s) as early as 1905vii.  Railway 
trips to holiday destinations are well documented from the early 1900s.  An early Ward Lock Guide 
(1901) to Lyme Regis and South Dorset claimed one of the areas virtues was that it was 'never 
inundated with train loads of noisy trippers’ being six miles from the nearest railway station.  Indeed, 
the railways promoted such activities with much advertising as discussed by Harrington (2004)viii.  
Evidence of trips by motor coach is rarer but advertisements in Ward Lock Guides published in the 
early 1920s show clearly that charabancs were well established in popular holiday resorts and were 
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providing whole-day and half-day excursions to local places of interest.  An example is shown in 
Figure 1, taken from Ward and Lock’s Bournemouth, 1921.  Birch Brothers appear to have been 
among the first to offer coach tours extending over a period of several days in the 1920s.  Other 
operators active in this field included Wallace Arnold Tours and Smith’s of Wigan.  
Figure 1:   Early advert from Ward and Lock’s Amanac 
 
 
Source: Advert from Ward and Lock’s Bournemouth, 1921 
Given the nature of the journey, it is likely that the railways perceived the competition from these 
excursions and tours earlier than the popular view reported in both contemporary and modern 
literature.  With the exception of London, where rail-based underground facilities provided journeys 
which mirrored their motorised bus counterparts, journeys by rail could not compete with the 
motorised buses which had both flexibility of route and the ability to stop potentially much closer to 
the origin and final destination of the passenger. 
The early 1920s therefore saw the first tension between the two modes of transport.  On the one hand 
the motorised bus was achieving success in local markets in which the railways found difficulty in 
competing and, on the other, was developing the longer distance excursions and tours, almost 
completely untouched by public intervention.  In contrast, the railways were heavily regulated. 
4. The origins of motor bus regulation 
Concomitant with the fast growth of motor traffic was an increase in the number of fatal and non-fatal 
motor accidents.  The growth of motor traffic, particularly in London, provoked the first official 
investigation into the potential regulation of all vehicles, including motorbuses.  The advisory 
Committee on London Traffic, set up in 1920, was convened to discuss the growing congestion.  
Concern for public safety was soon thereafter voiced with this lobby claiming that the growing 
number of vehicles on the streets – especially in the capital – not only caused congestion but also an 
increasing level of accidents.  The motorbus was particularly criticised as dangerous to the publicix..  
Some of the lobby cited the ‘pirates’ as a significant problem:  these were the operators, particularly in 
London, who operated where demand was strongest and without any recourse to a timetable and 
would change direction completely if more passengers looked likely to be going the other way. It was, 
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however, difficult to regulate motor traffic because the only available laws were then designed to 
control the much slower moving horse drawn transport of the nineteenth century discussed in Section 
3.  As a result, the newer problem of motorised traffic was referred in the first instance to the Taxation 
Committee of the Roads Department within the Ministry of Transport.  But early in 1922, the specific 
issues of motorbus taxation and regulation were sent on to a newly created Committee, the Hackney 
Vehicle Committee, which had greater local authority representation.   
The creation of this new Committee does not appear to have been politically motivated – indeed it was 
set up under Lloyd George’s Liberal Government but worked under the Conservative Government of 
Bonar Law.  Its first meeting in July 1922 was dominated by a discussion of safety matters.  Nor does 
this Committee appear to have had restrictive regulation as part of its remit as this was not in keeping 
with either the Liberal or Conservative Government’s policy of the day and would have taken 
considerable justification, as had been necessary with the railwaysx.  Successive Governments of the 
1920s acknowledged the need for motorbus regulation but parliamentary time was fully occupied with 
other measures considered to be of higher priority.  Only the London Traffic Act of 1924 was passed 
and this relied very heavily on the evidence and interim recommendations of the Hackney Vehicle 
Committee for its systematic regulation of London’s buses.  The passage of this Act and the unique 
nature of London make the capital a special case which is not the primary focus of this paper. 
Throughout the 1920s, both the tramway and the railway companies increasingly suffered from the 
competition of motor vehicles.  Tramway receipts fell by just over 21% in the decadexi and railway 
revenues dropped by 17% between 1923 and 1930xii.  However, of these two modes, it was the 
financial position of the railway companies which appeared to be of greater concern since investing in 
railway capital had been a favoured form of railway investment.  In contrast, by 1920, the majority of 
tramways were owned by local authoritiesxiii.  It was not until there was renewed political and public 
pressure in 1927, in the form of private bills before Parliament to allow railways to obtain powers to 
own operate or take financial interest in passenger-carrying motor transport (finally granted in August 
1928) that the Government acted to appoint a Royal Commission on Transport to examine the whole 
‘transport problem’.  The terms of reference were: 
"To take into consideration the problems arising out of the growth of 
road traffic and with a view to securing the employment of the 
available means of transport in Great Britain (including transport by 
sea coastwise and by ferries) to the greatest public advantage, to 
consider and report what measures, if any, should be adopted for their 
better regulation and control and, so far as is desirable in the public 
interest, to promote their co-ordinated working and development."xiv 
It is in the evidence before this Royal Commission that the issue of wasteful competition between 
transport modes emerged and has subsequently remained the popular interpretation of ensuing 
legislation.  This Commission provided a forum for many arguments to be aired, although these were 
only from the organised pressure groups and which has been suggested might have meant that the 
unanimity of opinion in favour of legislative restrictions was overstatedxv.  The most interesting 
arguments were those which sought regulation to protect the railways and trams and was justified by 
reference to the claim that motor vehicles did not ‘pay their way’ and that this, and the lack of 
restrictions, gave rise to unfair competition. 
The Royal Commission made a number of reports, and the second interim report dealt with the issues 
of the regulation of motor passenger carrying vehicles which gave the framework to the 1930 Road 
Traffic Act.  With the exception of how the regulation should be administered, discussed in the next 
section, the Royal Commission did not add much to the regulatory recommendations of the Committee 
whose origins had been based on investigating ways of improving safetyxvi.   
After presenting their second report, the Royal Commission went on to consider the question of co-
ordination.  The private Acts of 1928 which had enabled the railway companies to buy into bus 
companies had become operational before the second interim report had been published.  It is clear 
that the Royal Commission was to give consideration to co-ordination, according to its terms of 
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reference, and that it regarded these powers as promoting considerable co-ordination between road and 
rail through the acquisition by railways of substantial interests in bus operations.  However, only one 
piece of evidence before the Royal Commission, presented by the President of the LMS railway, Sir 
Josiah Stamp, suggested that the railways desire to acquire bus operations was motivated by the 
opportunity to co-ordinate services and that this was in conjunction with providing a better return for 
shareholders.  It is likely that his view was influenced by the great profits that had been realised by the 
Underground group in London when it had merged with the London General Omnibus Company in 
1912.  All subsequent evidence before the Royal Commission suggested that the railway companies’ 
main interest was to maximise the bus companies’ profits and so to increase income from this source 
rather than to promote or enhance co-ordination (a might be expected from companies in private 
ownership with shareholders to satisfy).   
The final report of the Royal Commission – the one devoted to co-ordination – recognised the 
different roles that road and rail transport could offer and concluded that the aim should be to 
harmonise and co-ordinate the newer and older forms of transport with the objective of obtaining from 
each the maximum of advantage to the publicxvii.  Whilst the members of the Commission managed to 
produce a unanimous Final report, its members were divided on the issue of ownership:  this led to 
comments about ‘unification’ and a stated belief that co-ordination would develop naturally through 
the play of economic forces and that such co-ordination would be better than any co-ordination 
enforced by the creation of a huge monopoly [by nationalisation], even if subject to Government 
control.  
5. The 1930s:  Regulation and ‘stabilisation’ of the motor bus 
sector 
The second interim Report from the Royal Commission formed the basis of the Road Traffic Bill that 
eventually became the Road Traffic Act 1930.  But in respect to motorbuses, the Royal Commission 
did not add any significant evidence to the deliberations of the Hackney Vehicle Committee.  By the 
time the Royal Commission had reported, the London Traffic Act of 1924 had been in place for some 
time.  The measures introduced in this Act had come from the deliberations of the Hackney Vehicle 
Committee (see Section 4 above) and the only significantly different recommendation from the Royal 
Commission was to suggest much larger administrative areas for the rest of the country outside 
London as opposed to vesting responsibility in the control of the local authority.  The Road Traffic 
Bill was presented to Parliament by Herbert Morrison in 1929, as Minister of Transport in the Labour 
Government, against the background of the Wall Street crash in the USA and a growing economic 
crisis.  As a minority Government, Labour was only able to introduce measures which had the support 
of the Liberals who held the balance of power.   
The 1930 Road Traffic Act divided the country into thirteen Traffic Areas: eleven in England and 
Wales (ten after 1933) and two in Scotland.  In each of these Traffic Areas, the licensing system was 
administered by the Traffic Commissioners.  As an independent tribunal, the Traffic Commissioners 
had a Chairman, directly appointed by the Minister of Transport, and two other Commissioners who 
were part-time; selected from a panels nominated by local authorities.  The 1930 Act, empowered the 
Traffic Commissioners to control entry and participation in the road passenger carrying industry by 
licensing the vehicles, services and service employees.   
Before a service could be operated, four separate licences needed to be obtained.  The ‘Certificate of 
Fitness’ which related to the state of the vehicle, subject to its owner being a ‘fit person’; the service 
personnel (both the driver and conductor (if used)) required licences, a public service licence was 
required for each vehicle and finally a road service licence was required for each operation of the 
vehicle for which passengers were carried at separate fares.  Services on which separate fares were 
charged fell into two classes, so far as licensing was concerned: stage carriage and express services. A 
minimum fare was used to distinguish between these categories.  Excursions and tours were normally 
recognised as a special type of express service (although the law made no such distinction) and the Act 
distinguished them from contract carriages where passengers did not pay separate fares, such as a 
private party on a special outing. 
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Very few commentators at the time or since disagreed with the public service licence or that drivers 
and conductors hold a licence guaranteeing their fitness as transport workers.  Such rules enhanced the 
bus service and provided for its safety. The road service licence, however, was contentious.  It 
authorised bus services and laid down the conditions under which companies operated.  When 
granting or refusing this licence commissioners considered the suitability of the route and the extent to 
which it was already served, how far the proposed service was necessary or desirable in the public 
interest, the needs of the area as a whole in relation to other traffic and the prospects for co-ordination 
of transport facilities within that area.  Even when successful the licensee had to make sure that fares 
were reasonable, were at a level that prevented any ‘wasteful’ competition with other forms of 
transport, that fares and timetables were available and that there were fixed pick-up and drop-off 
points. 
Although the criteria for granting a licence and the conditions attached to the road service licence were 
embodied in the 1930 Road Traffic Act, both the Traffic Commissioners and the Minister of Transport 
refused to identify any general criteria as to when a licence should be granted or rejected.  Thus the 
first five years of the Act’s operation provided a diverse experience for motorbus operators and 
significantly shaped the development of the industry because the Traffic Commissioners took 
relatively independent approaches, failed to use precedence in the granting of licences and had vague 
and at times inconsistent definitions of central terms like ‘suitability’ ‘necessary’, ‘desirable’’ 
adequate service’ or ‘wasteful competition’.  However, all Traffic Commissioners showed a common 
concern to achieve order and uniformity in what had previously been seen as a ‘chaotic’ industry.  In 
contrast, the second five years of the decade, showed much greater consistency between the Traffic 
Commissioners’ decisions.  Indeed, it might even be argued that the granting of all licenses had by 
then become more or less standardised and had introduced inertia into what had been a highly 
competitive and flexible industry.  
In terms of industrial structure, the decade saw increasing concentration of the businesses in the hands 
of large operators and the virtual demise of the small operator in terms of absolute numbers, although 
many still remained important on the boundaries of the larger operatorsxviii.  The granting of road 
service licences was guided by an overriding concern for the co-ordination of services and thus the 
Traffic Commissioners often favoured the large operators and showed a willingness to impose levels 
of service quite different from those that had emerged under competition.  Uniformity was also sought 
in the setting of faresxix and the protection of competing modes was considered a necessary but 
troublesome objective.  The 1930 Road Traffic Act also condoned the practice of cross-subsidisation 
of services by requiring the Traffic Commissioners to take account of the operation of ‘un-
remunerative services’ by the applicant of a road service licence thus destroying the ‘free marketplace’ 
where services which were profitable were run and those which were not, were not.  Furthermore, the 
preference given to existing operators in terms of perceived co-ordination benefits meant that new 
entry into the industry became increasingly difficult. 
The Road Traffic Act 1930 was thus a restrictive measure that led to the demise of the small operator 
and the emergence of spatial monopolies which were not in the philosophy of the Labour Government 
which favoured nationalisation:  this reaffirms safety as being of the prime concern in the origins of 
this legislation. 
6. Post-war nationalisation and de-nationalisation 
The ‘transport problem’ in the 1940s was dominated by the plight of the railways which had been 
over-used and under-invested during WW2.  This is in contrast to the more buoyant nature of the bus 
industry where the number of vehicles in use had grown by 22% between 1937 and 1947 and demand 
for local journeys was still growing.   
The Labour Government achieved a large parliamentary majority in the 1945 election which made it 
possible to implement its nationalisation proposals for transport which were embodied in the Transport 
Act 1947.  This was the response to the ‘transport problem’ and the culmination of a well debated 
philosophy elaborated throughout the 1930s.  The essence of this philosophy, as argued by Herbert 
Morrisonxx, was that the existence of competition between rival private rail and road companies (for 
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both passengers and freight) gave rise to inefficiencies that could not be solved by other than single 
ownership.  He recognised that a commitment to single ownership meant giving rise to a monopoly 
and, as private monopolies could not be trusted to pursue the public interest and would require 
significant resources by a Government which wanted them to serve the public good, a public 
monopoly was the solution.  It was also claimed that the public monopoly would give greater 
efficiency in management (although this is not borne out by more recent evidence).  A second strand 
to the debate was that a unified, comprehensive transport system would concern itself primarily with 
determining the most economical and efficient method of meeting a particular need – in short 
nationalisation should be organised functionally (by traffic type) and would lead to consolidation and 
co-ordination.  It was clear from this debate that a nationalised business was considered to be a sound 
business proposition and should be run as a business (ie not by the Government) and that this would 
lead to efficiency gains through co-ordination and integration, increases in the quality of service 
simultaneously with cost savings following unification, the provision of socially desirable but 
unprofitably services and improvements for the labour force.  Thus post-war, whilst the ‘transport 
problem’ was dominated by the state of the railways and there was perhaps an expectation that 
nationalisation for the railways was inevitable; the underlying philosophy demanded that the 
nationalisation of all transport assets was necessary to achieve maximum efficiency.   
The Transport Act, 1947 set up the British Transport Commission (BTC) as the executive body having 
the general duty ‘to provide an efficient, adequate, economical and properly integrated system of 
public inland transport and facilities’xxi.  The BTC acted as a non-executive, planning authority with 
the day to day management of the BTC’s assets delegated to newly formed Executives who were the 
agents of the BTC and were organised on a modal basis.  This complicated framework was to ensure 
that the process of state ownership created a ‘business’ which was accountable to Parliament but not 
run by Government.   
The 1947 Act was primarily concerned with the nationalisation of the railways, inland waterways, 
docks and road haulage.  The road passenger activities outside London were not automatically 
nationalised under the Act although provision was made for the BTC to purchase in this sector.  
However, when the former private railway companies were vested in the BTC, the BTC acquired a 
substantial interest in bus undertakings in the form of the railways’ shareholdings in bus companies.  
Also, the BTC acquired substantial passenger transport interests, including trolleybus undertakings, as 
a result of the separate nationalisation of electricity as well as making a separate purchase of Thomas 
Tilling, one of the bigger companies operating in England and Wales, and the Scottish Motor Traction 
Company. 
However, whilst the Act was founded on a well debated philosophy, it gave few guidelines to how the 
benefits of co-ordination and integration were to be achieved.  Financially, the BTC was expected to 
pay its way ‘taking one year with another’ suggesting that there would be a balance of surpluses and 
deficits and this would be in line with the servicing of the fixed interest stock which paid for the 
acquisitions.  In terms of charging, the BTC was expected to provide what was demanded at the 
cheapest possible price, but again with no advice.  
In terms of public control of road passenger transport, the 1947 Act was almost silent.  The BTC was 
only required to examine the road passenger transport operations outside London and to prepare Area 
Schemes for the co-ordination of all passenger transport services.  In practice, road passenger transport 
was the responsibility of the Roads Executive and they were preoccupied with the pressing need to 
deal with the set priority of the acquisition of road haulage operations.  More than a year passed before 
much progress was made on the preparation of an Area Scheme to promote ‘co-ordination’ of road 
passenger services (and even then, reference to road/rail co-ordination was not made).  The first Area 
Scheme was running into difficulties with the local authorities and bus operators who were making 
significant opposition (particularly since all those in favour had already sold out to the BTC).  Shortly 
after, another election in 1950 returned the Labour Government but with a much reduced majority and 
this limited the ability of the BTC, through its Executives, to push ahead with unpopular proposals.  
The following year, in 1951, a Conservative Government was successfully elected and all aspects of 
BTC activity was terminated.  There is no doubt that, if implemented, the Area Schemes for road 
passenger transport would have created the biggest move towards integration/co-ordination under the 
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1947 Act.  With the evidence of the intervening years from the Passenger Transport Areas created 
under the 1968 Transport Act in the UK and from European experience more widely, the creation of 
regional authorities do have a significant impact on the delivery of integrated and co-ordinated public 
transport. 
The outcome of the1947 Transport Act was to change the structure of ownership in the transport 
sector.  Railways were nationalised, although this was primarily to ameliorate the problems created by 
their use during WW2.  The road passenger transport industrial structure was also different:  a 
significant proportion of road passenger transport was now in public ownership (if only by accident).  
But the public control which organised how these vehicles were to operate had not been changed and 
indeed did not change with any significance until the deregulation of express services in 1980 and the 
privatisation and deregulation of all local services in 1985.   
7. Co-ordination – a commentary 
The idea of co-ordinated or integrated transport has been used as the justification for all the legislation 
discussed in this paper.  Unlike many of its European neighbours who decided early on to bring public 
transport into state ownership, UK transport issues have been characterised by considerations of 
ownership perhaps more than identifying how it should work. 
Another characteristic of UK policy would appear to be that Governments only acted when under 
pressure.  The aftermath of WW1 brought urgency in dealing with the railways.  The more chaotic 
nature of London traffic led to the Hackney Vehicle Committee recommendations being put in place 
for London with the London Traffic Act.  Post WW2 it was again the railways that prompted urgent 
action.  Associated with this ‘fire-fighting’ tendency, Government’s have suffered inertia when there 
is a lack of urgency.  It could be argued that the post WW2 road passenger transport industry was 
doing well – it was contributing positively to the profits of the BTC -  whereas road haulage issues 
were an urgent preoccupation of the Executive responsible for road transport under the BTC because 
of its interaction with the railways, the public commitment to nationalisation of road haulage and 
issues surrounding road and rail freight competitioin..  Thus action on the road passenger industry did 
not happen.   
One puzzling element of the 1947 Transport Act and its attempt to secure co-ordination and 
integration relates to the conflict between its underlying philosophy and its implementation.  The 
underlying philosophy was that a unified, comprehensive transport system would concern itself 
primarily with determining the most economical and efficient method of meeting a particular need and 
this is why all modes of transport should be under the responsibility of a single body.  It also suggests 
that the single body should be organised functionally so that passenger transport, freight transport and 
so on can be provided by the most efficient mode.  In this respect, the 1947 Transport Act was almost 
doomed to failure in its attempt to provide co-ordinated and integrated transport by organising the day 
to day responsibilities on a modal basis.  Although this organisation was carried over from the first 
introduction of a Ministry of Transport in 1919, there was no requirement to maintain this structure.  
In the UK it is a lesson only learnt recently, following the Eddington Transport Study (2006)xxii that 
better policy for passenger and freight traffic comes from a functional organisation of the Ministry and 
the UK Ministry w as been thus reorganised in 2007.   
Whilst ‘integration’ and ‘co-ordination’ have been the corner-stone of the development of public 
policy, it was at no time carefully specified as to what this meant.  Whilst the Royal Commission did 
have a view about co-ordination and believed in particular that railways buying road passenger 
operating companies would enhance co-ordination, it did not explain how its recommendations would 
enhance this concept.  In relation to the implementation of the1930 Road Traffic Act, co-ordination 
was associated with creating a ‘tidy’ and well ordered sector.  In the case of the Area Schemes under 
the 1947 Transport Act, co-ordination was identified as removing the restrictive practices of adjoining 
operators and operations.  But neither of these required the form of legislation that was employed.  
Similarly, ‘integration’ was not well defined by the Labour Government in its post-war development 
on policy and it could have taken a number of forms:  traffic could have been diverted to the most 
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suitable mode either by ‘directive’ or by adopting a charges policy which favoured a mode for a 
particular traffic. 
Perhaps the biggest contribution to the failure to achieve the co-ordination and integration implied by 
legislation was a lack of recognition as to the role of pricing.  In the implementation of the 1930 Road 
Traffic Act, the Traffic Commissioners were deliberately invited to promote cross subsidy between 
routes and additionally, in setting standard fares they failed to recognise that operators with lower 
costs could offer a lower fare.  Perhaps this was understandable given the nature of knowledge about 
the role of pricing in the early 1930s.  But by the end of the 1930s decade, the role of price as a signal 
was well developed yet ignored by the legislation.  As identified earlier, the BTC was required to 
generally break even and to provide what was demanded at the cheapest possible price without 
direction as to how this should be done.  The lack of explicit direction, the statutory financial 
requirement to break even and the need not to discriminate unfairly led to a systematic drift towards 
average pricing and thus to cross subsidy.  Indeed, that this was not understood became clear in the 
BTC’s first attempt at setting rates which equalised those of road and rail for freight without 
recognising the different cost base of each mode.  
8. Conclusions 
The developments in the UK were thus characterised by a stronger discussion of the nature of the 
ownership and its impact on delivering co-ordination and integration than its European neighbours.  
This was linked to the ‘crisis management’ approach of successive Governments in relation to 
preserving the popular investment of the railway for the public.  Had the railways been brought into 
state ownership in the 1920s, a debate as to how to define and achieve co-ordination and integration 
might have occurred. 
A review of the historical evidence suggests a number of missed opportunities, particularly in relation 
to the outcome of the 1947 Transport Act.  Had the design of the legislation been more aligned to the 
intellectual debate of the 1930s, the policy of the Labour Government may well have been realised.  
Instead it required a further twenty years to pass before the realisation that co-ordination and 
integration were features of aligning functions and fares rather than a requirement to hold all assets in 
the public sector. 
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